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Abstract 
Despite the growing importance attached to modularity in theory and in practice, the 
automotive industry has shown substantial resistance to the trend towards modularization. 
This paper explores what this evidence implies for the management of inter-firm coordination 
and submits that the link between product architecture (modular or not) and inter-firm 
coordination should be substantially revised. This is demonstrated comparing empirical data 
gathered at a major first tier supplier on two different co-development projects carried out 
with two European car makers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent research has shown that in the automotive industry the diffusion of industry 
standards (Steinmuller, 2003), industry platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008) and 
modularity (Sturgeon, 2002) has been quite limited so far. Overall the automotive industry, a 
prototypical case of inter-firm coordination in the context of product innovation (Womack et 
al, 1990, Clark and Fujimoto, 1991), has shown substantial resistance to the trend towards 
modularization (Mac Duffie, 2008).  
This paper explores what this evidence implies for the management of inter-firm 
coordination with a particular focus on how the coordination of knowledge production takes 
place in the automotive industry. 
We studied and compared two co-development projects carried out by a Japanese first 
tier supplier with two European car makers. For each of the two projects we observed the 
division of design and engineering tasks between the car maker and the supplier and the inter-
firm organizational mechanisms at work. By means of a “quasi-experimental design” 
approach (Romanelli and Tushman, 1986), the goal was to isolate one parameter (the 
characteristic of the development project and of the system object of co-development) and 
observe eventual differences in inter-firm coordination between the two car makers.  
Our empirical evidence shows that inter-firm coordination depends on (1) buyer’s 
endowment of resources, (2) the technological capabilities they have developed over time, 
and (3) the ability to design and operate inter-firm coordination characterized by intense 
information sharing and cooperation. Moreover, we show that, at least in the automotive 
industry, the need for ‘thick’ supply relationships persists, no matter how modular 
components are.  
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of the literature 
and presents our research questions. Section three describes the method. Section four presents 
the empirical findings. Section five concludes the paper and offers research and managerial 
implications. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As predicted by some of the most important studies of the early nineties (e.g. Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991, Womack et al, 1990), the last two decades witnessed a steady increase of 
vehicle development outsourcing. This trend, paralleled by manufacturing outsourcing, led to 
dramatic de-verticalization processes and a re-definition of the vertical contracting structure 
of the auto industry towards a tiered configuration with global mega suppliers (Sturgeon and 
Florida, 2004). 
As this deverticalization process took place, it seemed as if the auto industry would 
soon mimic the computer industry and converge to a modular configuration, though with an 
inverse causal sequence. There, modularity in product design had led to modular production, 
modular organizations and the fragmentation of the industry (Langlois, 2003; Baldwin & 
Clark, 2006; Jacobides, 2005). Here it was changes in the vertical contracting structure of the 
industry which was supposed to be driving a differentiated and contrasted transition to 
modular product design (Fourcade and Midler 2004; Sako and Murray 1999; Sako, 2003). In 
reality, this did not happen. Despite the efforts of some US and European carmakers, 
modularization has not been implemented successfully, with rare exceptions. 
Ro, Liker and Fixson (2008) show that during the 1990s American automakers 
dedicated themselves to reengineering their product development systems, benchmarking the 
Japanese model -regarded as extremely effective in delivering high-quality component 
systems integrated into the vehicle with short design lead times-, and outsourcing increasing 
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levels of vehicle content and design responsibility. In a different study (Ro, Liker and Fixson, 
2007) they analyze how the auto industry has been attempting to move to modularity, in part, 
motivated by the desire to emulate the success of Dell Computers in achieving mass 
customization, build-to-order and a streamlined supply chain. They maintain that this 
movement towards modularization has led to major changes in supply chain practices based 
partly on imitation of successful keiretsu models in Japan and a move toward modules. They 
find significant impact of modularity on outsourcing, product development, and supply chain 
coordination, and observe that modularity has accompanied a major reorganization of the 
automotive supplier industry.  
Both studies, however, show that this reorganization has not been successful because: a) 
most modularity activities appear to be primarily strategically cost reduction driven, leaving 
the potential of modularity for mass customization largely untapped; and b) the shift in 
industry reorganization has not been accompanied by changes in the supply chain 
infrastructure to encourage long-term partnerships. This contrasts with the more gradual 
approach used by Toyota and other Japanese automakers, who undertake modularity efforts 
on a selective basis while moving towards a build-to-order model. Fujimoto and Donsheng 
(2006) show how Japanese automakers choose strategically transaction patterns for the 
detailed design drawings of auto parts to achieve the efficiency of inter-firm cooperation in 
the new product development process. Only within this framework they find that functional 
modularity of auto parts is positively correlated with the outsourcing of design drawings. 
Overall, modularity has been implemented only in the design of selected auto parts, 
with closed standard interfaces beneficial in strategies based on product variety, quick market 
response and short product life-cycles (Holweg and Pil, 2004; Pil and Cohen, 2006). Besides, 
the few empirical studies about the interactions between modularity and outsourcing in the 
auto industry are controversial and show that the direction of influence between product 
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architecture and firm boundaries varies across individual processes and over time (Sako, 
2003; Camuffo, 2004; Fixson, Ro and Liker, 2005; MacDuffie, 2008).  
The empirical evidence is that the product architecture of automobiles has remained 
integral, with component interfaces that are neither standard, nor open, and with Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (henceforth OEMs) keeping in house large amounts of design 
knowledge as concerns both system integration and specific components (Mac Duffie, 2008).  
Echoing a growing body of literature that has underlined that “modularity” has left 
behind many unfulfilled promises (e.g. Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001, Sturgeon, 2003), 
MacDuffie (2008) clarifies what has happened in the auto industry and suggests that inter-
firm coordination processes are far from being resolved by loosely coupled organization  
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). In theory modularization should eliminate interdependencies 
between assemblers and suppliers -since interfaces between product components are defined 
and codified ex-ante-, but as many studies show in practice organizational interdependencies 
remain ubiquitous. They continually emerge throughout the product development process, 
despite efforts to limit them (Staudenmayer, Tripsas and Tucci, 2005). Thus, modularization 
does not substitute for inter-organizational integration mechanisms, and there may even be 
decreasing returns to modularity-in-design efforts because of buyer-supplier integration 
problems (Mikkola, 2003; Brusoni, 2005; MacDuffie, 2008, Zirpoli and Becker, 2008). 
MacDuffie (2008) concludes that the automotive industry is a typical example of an 
industry where modularity shows its technical and organizational limits and, hence, remains 
characterized by persistent integrality. But if the auto industry is characterized by persistent 
integrality and, at the same time, by high levels of product development outsourcing, two 
challenges stand out: (1) how can firms effectively organize the involvement of suppliers in 
their new product development process, and (2) what are the variable that firms have to 
consider in making decisions concerning supplier involvement. 
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Early literature on these questions offered many heuristics, based on ideas such as 
segmenting suppliers according to the product that is purchased, the timing of involvement, 
the type of interface, the nature of the relationship, etc. (Lamming, 1993, Clark and Fujimoto, 
1991, Liker et al., 1996, Dyer, Cho and Chu, 1998). The dominant approach on how to 
discern about the nature of the relationship, however, was considered to be rooted in the 
assessment of the typology of the component purchased. Dyer (1996), for example, argues 
that buyer-supplier relations should be at arm's length relationships in the case of 
commodities or standardized parts with no significant side effects on other components and  
supplier relations. Instead, collaborative partnerships should be preferable with suppliers 
offering complex, high value, non-standard inputs, characterized by multiple interaction 
effects with other inputs.  
More recent literature has brought into the picture other sources of heuristics. Following 
management research focus on knowledge as the most important asset in today’s business 
world (Grant, 1996, Spender, 1996), studies on new product development have also 
emphasized the role of knowledge and framed “make or buy” decisions as decisions on how 
the knowledge required to carry out design tasks is allocated between buyers and suppliers 
(knowledge partitioning) (Takeishi, 2002; Lee and Veloso, 2008). The decision on how to 
allocate design and production tasks along the supply chain in such a way that coordination 
cost (including transaction cost) is minimized (Dyer, 1996) needs to be complemented with 
the decision on what knowledge buyers and suppliers need to develop and maintain (Takeishi, 
2002, Fujimoto and Takeishi, 2003). Indeed, the outsourcing rationale and the “coordination 
toolkit” to manage the problem of coordination induced by outsourcing, should be different 
contingent on the innovativeness of the purchased component: more innovative components 
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are more complex to handle when the knowledge dimension is taken into account1 (Takeishi, 
2002). Wolter and Veloso (2008) develop this point linking the evolution of product 
architecture through innovations to the vertical scope of an industry, with transaction costs 
and capabilities as moderators. In their view, modular innovations should be associated with 
vertical disintegration, while architectural and radical innovations should call for vertical 
integration.  
From this overview of the literature it emerges that when firms design and adopt inter-
firm coordination mechanisms, in the case of complex products development, they have to 
consider a complex bundle of variables, spanning from the type of component they buy, the 
type of interfaces between components and the impact of the allocation of design activities on 
knowledge development. These variables, moreover, tend to change over time and across 
projects, even when the same supplier is involved, thus complicating the picture. It is 
possible, however, to distill some synthetic remarks on the link between product architecture, 
the division of labor and knowledge and inter-firm coordination that seem to be supported 
convincingly by empirical evidence in the auto industry: 
1. product architecture alone cannot determine either the nature of buyer-supplier 
relationships or the level of product development outsourcing (Sako, 2003; Ro, 
Fixson and Liker, 2005; Mac Duffie, 2008); 
2. “thick” buyer-supplier relationships aimed at learning and problem solving are key 
for achieving coordination in complex product development (Helper, MacDuffie 
and Sabel, 2000; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004; MacDuffie and Helper, 2006); 
3. the integrating firm’s knowledge and the impact of product development 
outsourcing on the allocation of learning opportunities along the value chain is a 
                                                
1 More innovative components development, in fact, entails potential knowledge spillovers to competitors, 
potential hold-up, uncertainty about development and manufacturing cost, perspective impact on other models 
sharing the same platform or architecture. 
8 
 
key variable in deciding on inter-firm coordination modes (Brusoni, Prencipe and 
Pavitt, 2001; Takeishi, 2001, Fujimoto and Takeishi, 2003; Lee and Veloso, 2008). 
 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
With these assumptions in mind, we designed and carried out a case study in order to observe 
how buyer and supplier coordinate their engineering and design efforts. We decided to build 
our sample using the principles of experimentation. More specifically we applied to our 
qualitative approach a “quasi-experimental design” (Romanelli and Tushman, 1986). The 
basic idea was to isolate one parameter (the characteristic of the development project and of 
the system object of co-development) and then see whether and how coordination 
mechanisms changed.  To do so, we followed a two-step process. First, we decided what 
component/system would be the object of analysis. Then, we set the conditions to make the 
two cases comparable.  
 
Case study  selection 
The choice of the component/system object of the analysis was key to make the comparison 
fruitful. Following Takeishi and Fujimoto’s (2003) observation that a vehicle can be 
decomposed using different levels of granularity (from a single component such as brake 
caliper to a front module made of many heterogeneous components), we chose to select a 
system at relatively aggregate level of analysis, i.e. a system made of a significant number of 
sub-components involving heterogeneous technologies. In fact, in the development of such 
systems, car makers usually involves many suppliers facing challenging coordination 
processes. Among the main systems that make up a vehicle - occupant safety system, brake 
system, power train, heat, ventilation and air conditioning, doors, cockpit, front end, etc. - we 
9 
 
selected the Air Conditioning System because, relative to the others, it is more “modular”. In 
fact, its interfaces are typically clearly defined and codified by the OEM both in terms of 
performance requirements and technical specifications, including the definition of physical 
interfaces. We deliberately opted for a system characterized by a relatively high level of 
functional and physical “isolability”, because we wanted to study if the presence of a self-
contained component with clearly defined and codified interfaces could influence inter-firm 
coordination. We made this choice assuming that clearly defined and codified interfaces:  
• either work as an ex-ante, embedded, partial substitute for high-power inter-firm 
integration mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms enabling intense cooperation and 
information sharing). In this case, loose coupling in component designs would works 
as a functional equivalent of inter-organizational coordination mechanisms – which is 
what standard modularity theory maintains. The need for ‘thick’ collaborative supply 
relationships should be reduced because knowledge encapsulation within modules 
would allow for economizing on inter-organizational coordination and control. 
• or work as a complement to high-power inter-organizational coordination mechanisms. 
In this interpretation, ‘thick’ and collaborative supply relationships based on high-
powered inter-organizational coordination mechanisms remain even in the case of a 
relatively highly modular component (as the A/C system), because modularization is 
not the logical antecedent but a consequence of inter-firm integration. In fact, 
modularity would require long time and comprehensive efforts by both assemblers and 
suppliers to be achieved and, hence, buyers and suppliers would tend to remain 
engaged in ‘hand-in-glove’ relationships. 
When we approached the designated A/C supplier, DNTS, a major global supplier of 
thermal systems for the automotive industry, we found confirmation of our approach. As 
predicted by the literature (MacDuffie, 2008), the R&D chief explained to us that the 
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components designed and produced by DNTS could not be easily functionally isolated. 
However, the R&D Chief confirmed that among the various main systems of a car the A/C 
system could be considered among the most modular or loosely coupled with the rest of the 
vehicle.  
 
Object of comparison 
The second step was to set the context to conduct our comparative analysis. We selected 
two distinct development projects, started approximately in the same period, in which DNTS 
was developing respectively the A/C system for two car models developed by two competing 
OEMs. Both A/C systems should have targeted the same market segment, and should have 
been characterized by similar technology and degree of novelty. The two projects should have 
been typical, i.e. a good proxy for the usual way DNTS and its customers co-develop an A/C 
system. With these criteria in mind, we selected the following projects: 
• Project-A, i.e. the development of the A/C system for a new ALPHA light commercial 
vehicle with a passengers use variant. The project was launched in 2003 and was derived from 
an existing A/C platform; 
• Project-B, i.e. the development of the A/C system for a new BETA light commercial 
vehicle with a passengers use variant and a direct competitor of the Alpha model we analyzed. 
Also this project was launched in 2003 and was derived from an existing A/C platform. 
As regards data sources and gathering, we analyzed company documents and conducted 
several rounds of structured and semi-structured interviews  between November 2007 and 
April 2008. Table 1 lists the managers we interviewed and the duration of the interviews2. We 
decided to interview both the projects ‘account managers’ (responsible for the commercial 
                                                
2 We also conducted Design Structure Matrix and Task Structure Matrix analysis for both projects. The details 
and the result of this analysis are reported in another study. 
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relationship with the OEM from the pre-offer phase until the end of the project) and the 
‘project managers’ (responsible for component or system development)3.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
FINDINGS 
This section is structured as follows. First we frame the relationship between  DNTS and 
BETA and ALPHA in the broader context of  DNTS business in Europe. We then describe 
the specific inter-firm organizational settings characterizing the projects under observation. 
After having reported in details on the relationship between  DNTS, ALPHA and BETA we 
will provide a comparison between the two dyads. 
 
The genesis of  DNTS relationships with ALPHA and BETA 
DNTS was established in 1987 as Magneti Marelli Climatizzazione at a time when the 
Fiat Group and Magneti Marelli decided to enter the growing car air-conditioning industry. In 
1990 a joint venture was set up with the Japanese Denso Corporation (Nippondenso, at the 
time), world leader in the industry, leading the company into a phase of rapid growth of 
investments in R&D structures, new production facilities, technologies and competencies, and 
a stronger presence in the European Market. In 2001 Denso acquired full ownership of the 
company that adopted the name Denso Thermal Systems S.p.A. (DNTS). This allowed the 
company to become a fully fledged part of the Denso group, world leader in the field of 
automotive thermal systems. Nowadays, DNTS designs, develops, manufactures and sells air- 
conditioning systems, engine cooling systems, heat exchangers, radiators and compressors for 
                                                
3 As Table 1 shows we did not interview managers at the car makers. In fact, as we were interested in 
triangulating data on two projects, only DNTS’ managers could provide us the comparative perspective we 
needed. 
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cars, commercial and industrial vehicles and also for tractors, earth moving machinery, busses 
etc. It is also active in designing and assembling integrated cockpit and front-end modules for 
cars. DNTS supplies all the major automotive manufacturers in Europe and South America. 
DNTS started its relationship with ALPHA and BETA, two major european automotive 
companies, by targeting the commercial vehicle segment in the early 1990s. DNTS intuition 
was that there was a possibility to attack this niche because  it was characterized by (1) a 
below average quality of the systems offered by the existing competitors and (2) a relative 
minor importance that the local suppliers gave to the light commercial vehicle segment at that 
time. These two aspects combined helped DNTS to enter a quite protected local market where 
most suppliers were local.  
 
Project-A 
The Project-A project was developed by DNTS for ALPHA. The project concerns the 
development of the A/C system for new ALPHA light commercial vehicle with a passengers 
use variant. The Project-A was derived from an existing product platform. DNTS was the 
only supplier for both projects. Currently, the previous project and Project-A represent about 
40% of the DNTS’s volumes with ALPHA, about 13% of the DNTS’s revenue with ALPHA, 
and about 2% of the total DNTS’s revenues. 
The genesis of the Project-A project dates back in 2002 when ALPHA asked to its usual 
suppliers to suggest a new concept for the A/C system of the a new ALPHA compact car. 
More specifically, ALPHA asked to its suppliers to develop a conditioning system with a 
semi-centred architecture and with an air mixture system based on the one employed by 
Mercedes (an air mixture system based on air). This concept was novel for ALPHA though 
not for the industry where other OEMs had already employed this A/C solution (e.g. 
Mercedes). After an initial evaluation of the supplier proposals, ALPHA selected the Behr 
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project. The DNTS sales & marketing manager reported to us, “Behr got the contract  because 
it was the main ALPHA supplier and because they were the main expert of the mixture air 
system required by ALPHA. Behr supplied this kind of A/C systems to Mercedes”. ALPHA 
paid all the development activities and acquired the property of the designs. Behr developed 
the project for one year. When the process reached the industrialization phase, ALPHA 
defined the project requirements and asked for a quotation not only from Behr but also from 
Valeo and DNTS. 
When the Request for Quotation (RFQ) was launched in 2003, Behr, Valeo, and DNTS 
had 3-4 months to reply. DNTS despite the early success of Behr managed to acquire the 
business. The sales & marketing manager that worked on the project said that DNTS won for 
three main reasons. First, ALPHA did not specify the kind of mixture air system in its offer: 
DNTS’s intuition was that ALPHA was not fully satisfied by the new mixture system 
developed by Behr; DNTS, hence, decided to develop a concept with a “standard” mixture air 
system instead of the new one. The reason was mainly that the Mercedes system was working 
well only under specific conditions that did not seem to apply to the architecture of ALPHA 
cars. Second, the prototype developed by DNTS had the highest performance levels. Third, 
DNTS was the only one that had decided to open a new production site co-located to ALPHA 
(Vigo, Spain). In this phase ALPHA did not fixed a target price and DNTS suggested its own 
price. In defining this price DNTS had an advantage over its competitors, also due to the 
decision of locating the production of the component close to the ALPHA assembly plant. 
DNTS won the RFQ in 2003, and was involved by ALPHA 48 months before the expected 
ramp-up.  
In the next three sections we report respectively on the role of interfaces and component 
architecture in DNTS-ALPHA inter-organizational coordination, the role of high-powered 
inter-organizational coordination mechanisms, the nature of the DNTS-ALPHA  relationship. 
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The role of interfaces and component architecture in DNTS-ALPHA inter-organizational 
coordination 
Our interviewees were unanimous in stating that ALPHA fixed the product’s 
architecture and the interfaces in great detail. Overall, ALPHA did not leave space to its 
suppliers for what concerns the architecture definition. Moreover, as seen above, while during 
the concept development, DNTS had the opportunity to ask changes about the interfaces, 
during the product development phase the interfaces were stable.  
All the managers we interviewed stressed the ALPHA’s ability in well defining the 
specifics (interfaces, functions, performance levels, etc.) claiming that these were one of the 
main coordination tools used by ALPHA. “In ALPHA the specifics remain stable after the 
avant phase” (48 months before the ramp up). The R&D chief of the project explained to us 
that ALPHA had a main set of specifics for the A/C system that was articulated in dossiers, 
one for each component. The main set of specifics contains the general requirements and 
standards for the system. The interfaces, defined inside the main set of specifics, were usually 
well specified also because ALPHA previously designed the other components of the car and 
then the A/C system. “ALPHA is seen as a strict OEM that does not change its specifics: once 
the specifics are set, these do not change for all the suppliers involved in the car 
development” (“ALPHA’s projects are very stable for all the suppliers”)4.  
Interface standardization was not coupled with functional isolation though. The R&D 
chief of the project explained that “the A/C system shares several functions with other 
components, and the integration issues are all managed by ALPHA that defines the A/C 
system performances and interfaces knowing the interdependencies with the other 
                                                
4 In a companion study, using TSM and DSM analysis, we measured analytically the stability of  interfaces and 
the level of modularity in the project finding confirmation of this qualitative description. 
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components of the car. […] When ALPHA defines the specifics for the compressor, it knows 
that the compressor interacts with the A/C system, therefore sets the right specifications for 
both the A/C system and the compressor”.  
The R&D chief of the project reported to us that “ALPHA on the same platform has 
several groups made by different suppliers that are interchangeable even if the systems are not 
the same. This is because ALPHA well defines all the specifics that are available to all the 
suppliers”. These manager said, “ALPHA is very modular”5. We then asked to the R&D 
ALPHA Engineering Manager what was his perception about modularity. The manger told us 
that  “modular designs would greatly reduce the necessity to interact with the clients 
[ALPHA]” because in case of modular designs “the car-maker would define the specifics, and 
the suppliers might interpret these trough their modalities”. “Now there is a certain 
transparency, with the systems of different suppliers that are pretty similar”. But the manager 
also specified that product modularity required a high level of system and component 
knowledge to well and precisely define both the specifications and the interfaces. ALPHA, in 
fact, had a strong knowledge both about the A/C system and its integration inside the car. 
ALPHA translated this knowledge not only in good specifics but also in the detailed 
specifications of the components inside the A/C system. The R&D managers went on saying 
“the car maker should define the A/C system functions and the performances leaving us the 
possibility to find the best technical solution. Nobody [in the car industry] has this approach. I 
believe that modularity is mainly diffused in the electronic industry but in our industry we 
have not already found the right level to have true black boxes because OEMs need more 
                                                
5 More generally in our interviews it emerged that when Alpha develops a platform, the A/C system has the same 
architecture for models. Even when there is a carry-over, the A/C system’s architecture does not change, while 
other carmakers, as Beta, allow changes in the interfaces. The engineering manager said: “Alpha is excellent 
about standardization. Thanks to this ability, they realize several car models, as the model X, model Y, and 
model Z, with the same air conditioning system”.  
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experience. ALPHA is near the modularity approach but they are intrusive, they should make 
a step back…. An OEM needs several competences to modularize a system”.  
Therefore, ALPHA that had a high vertical integration level was considered by DNTS 
to be close to define a modular A/C system. The key for achieving modularization in 
component design was ALPHA’s knowledge about the design of the architecture and the sub-
components of the A/C system. This knowledge was at the heart of ALPHA’s ability to define 
both the interfaces between the A/C system and the rest of the vehicle and the interfaces 
between sub-components ex ante. We also observed that the interfaces were stable because 
ALPHA got involved in the design of the A/C system sub-components. The R&D manager 
acknowledged the paradox “product modularity might allow employing a pure black-box 
approach but product modularization requires a high knowledge about the components to 
modularize and when you can combine modularity and a black-box approach you risk losing 
the product competences needed to control the system architecture”. 
Therefore, we asked whether DNTS preferred an OEM that defined the architecture and 
the specifics leaving the supplier the freedom to develop the component in a black-box 
fashion, or if it preferred an approach such as that of ALPHA. “Definitively the first”, the 
R&D chief said, because a black-box approach leaves more space to the supplier. The 
manager specified that ALPHA by providing the specifics for inner A/C components, limited 
DNTS’s contribution to innovation. On the other hand, the same managers admitted that 
ALPHA supported DNTS’s design and engineering. Overall, DNTS managers acknowledged 
that during the project they had many opportunities for learning from ALPHA. 
From the interviews, hence, it emerged that ALPHA had high technical competences 
about the A/C system and its sub-components. Following the sales & marketing manager, 
ALPHA deepened and maintained its technical knowledge directly cooperating with some 
second tier suppliers, especially to develop new components: “ALPHA is integrating internal 
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competences till being able to develop the components inside the A/C system”. “They are 
increasing their integration level to be more competent and competitive, and they have the 
resources to do it.” It was due to its technical knowledge that ALPHA was able to define all 
the A/C system interfaces and, often, it defined the characteristics of the border components. 
The engineering manager reported to us that when they tested together with ALPHA the 
performance of the Project-A, results were totally positive. DNTS managers also said that 
they were highly confident that the test results would have been good as “their [ALPHA’s] 
specifics were clear and did not change so much. Moreover, we strictly followed their 
specifics”.  
 
The role of high-powered inter-organizational coordination mechanisms 
Despite the detailed and stable definition of specifics and interfaces, the project required 
intense information sharing. The formal information exchange consisted of a monthly meeting 
to plan the activities, plus other two meetings a month to resolve technical issues. Moreover, 
the DNTS’s project and area chief engineers were in contact via e-mail or telephone calls with 
the ALPHA corresponding chiefs. These interactions were more frequent (daily interactions) 
and intense during the concept development and the preliminary design, while they were less 
frequent after these phases6.  
The daily contacts usually aimed at resolving problems that might stop the project. In 
fact, ALPHA defined the interfaces and the specifics but these could not resolve all the 
interdependencies between the A/C system and the car ex-ante. In this respect, the 
engineering manager said: “We contact ALPHA to verify to have correctly understood their 
requirements or if we needed help. The goal is to not stop the project development till the next 
meeting”.  
                                                
6 We were told that, while the frequency of the e-mails and telephone calls usually depended on the complexity, 
newness, and phase of the project, the number of meetings was standard. 
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In any case, DNTS co-located the design and engineering team close to the main 
ALPHA location in France. For the occasion DNTS rented a space and permanently staffed 
two engineers. In fact, despite the scheduled monthly meetings, frequent phone calls, detailed 
interfaces definition and contractual agreements, DNTS managers highlighted the fact that 
face to face communication was indispensable: “when the project was launched, we rented a 
space near ALPHA to be able to meet the client on a daily basis. The “human interfaces” 
consisted of two engineers coordinated by the area-chief”. 
 
The nature of the DNTS-ALPHA  relationship 
DNTS managers univocally described the relationship with ALPHA as a cooperative 
one. However, they acknowledged that they were accepting some potentially harmful 
behaviors by ALPHA. For example, DNTS knew that it could be substituted during the life of 
the project by a supplier offering better conditions and despite the fact that DNTS had 
invested in development activities. However, despite this possibility existed DNTS affirmed: 
“We are not afraid, ALPHA has never changed a supplier with another”. DNTS managers 
were aware that DNTS was difficult to substitute having a co-located plant. Moreover, DNTS 
considered itself a technological leader. This assured protection. 
Also ALPHA’s rigidity in the contractual definitions of specifics and interfaces was not 
considered as an “hostile” practice: “The more an OEM is contractual (i.e. it well defines all 
the specifics and calls for the respect of the agreement), the less we have to debate, while the 
less are the specifics the higher is the room for conflicts”. Our interviewees confirmed that: 
“every time that the specifics are strictly defined by ALPHA, the latter becomes fully 
responsible for the final result”. On the other hand, “when the specifics are very detailed and 
strict, every time we believe that they should change, for example because the specifics are 
incompatible with the performances required, there are conflicts”.  
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A final note on pricing. Price reductions were established and enforced by the contract 
(2% every year for four years). The volume to produce (and therefore the production capacity 
required by ALPHA) was specified in the contract. However, the price was not based and 
fixed exclusively on these volumes. The DNTS’s sales & marketing manager said: “We are 
not afraid about volumes. Only in one case we did not reach the planned volumes and 
ALPHA paid us the lost amortization”. This is a very fair approach, but also quite rare in the 
industry. 
 
Project-B  
The Project-B project was developed by DNTS for BETA. The project regarded the 
development of the A/C system for the new BETA light commercial vehicle. DNTS was the 
only supplier for the analyzed project. Currently, the Project-B has a weight on the DNTS’s 
revenue of about 6% of the total revenues, while this project represents about the 90% of the 
DNTS’s revenue with BETA. The production volumes of the Project-B are about 200000 
pieces a year. 
In 2003 BETA launched the RFI (Request for Information). During this step BETA 
provided the competing suppliers with the forecasted A/C system volumes (BETA usually 
involved five suppliers for the A/C system: DNTS, Valeo, Behr, Delphi, Carlsonic. Valeo was 
the first with about the 80% of the BETA business). The suppliers were asked to suggest the 
best technical solution and the price. Once this phase was completed, BETA chose the best 
technical solution and launched the RFQ. DNTS won the RFQ at the end of 2004. The 
development took about two years. The Project-B’s production started in 2007.   
The sales & marketing manager said that DNTS was able to acquire the above business 
thanks to its technical knowledge, the cooperative approach toward the carmaker, and for the 
low price. The DNTS sales and marketing manger explained that price was an important 
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variable. However, only the suppliers that had previously demonstrated their technical 
capabilities could participate to the RFQ. BETA, in fact, had employed a complex 
certification procedure: “to be a BETA’s supplier you need to pass a strict exam every 5-6 
years. Therefore BETA supposes that you are able to develop the A/C system required and 
this is why they push the price competition”.  
As for the project DNTS-ALPHA described above, Project-B was developed on the 
basis of a previous A/C system, the one developed for another BETA model by Valeo. In this 
project, DNTS introduced some modifications for the OEM. These innovations were mainly 
related to the internal system’s structure, and had the aim to reduce the system’s noise and 
volumes. The R&D manager said: “We improved the evaporator dimensions that changed 
from 90 mm to 38 mm”, “we also improved the performances and noise of the electro-
ventilation system”. Moreover the system was able to cool the car more quickly.  
The R&D manager said: “To develop this project we took the Model R and inserted our 
A/C system inside the car. We showed the improvements following the introduction of our 
A/C system and demonstrated that we were able to fit their specifics and that the changes we 
suggested were highly performing”. Moreover the DNTS manager said: “To demonstrate the 
improvements we performed several tests on the A/C system, on car’s prototypes, and on the 
final model”. “The tests on the system do not allow understanding substantial differences (i.e. 
among different A/C systems). In fact, only when the system is integrated into the vehicle 
these differences are evident”. These words highlight how BETA leaves space to its suppliers 
that can suggest new solutions that can even contradict the BETA specifics. DNTS considers 
BETA’s cooperative and interactive approach one of its strength. But from our interviews it 
also emerged that it was difficult for both parties to forecast the A/C system performances 
until it was assembled in the final product. Our interviewees at DNTS reported once again 
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that “the tests on the A/C system alone do not always let us understand the true performances 
of the A/C system”.  
As for Project-A, in the next three sections we report respectively on the role of interfaces and 
component architecture in DNTS-ALPHA inter-organizational coordination, the role of high-
powered inter-organizational coordination mechanisms, the nature of the DNTS-BETA  
relationship. 
 
The role of interfaces and component architecture in DNTS-BETA inter-organizational 
coordination 
BETA usually outsourced the A/C system after having defined the spatial constraints 
and the main interfaces the A/C system would have to match. However, nearly no interfaces 
remained stable over the life of the project. An interviewee reported to us that “BETA starts 
with hypotheses that have to be defined in more details and then selected”. For example 
“changes in the cockpit style might require changes in the A/C system” or “the options they 
require might imply changes in the architecture”. Indeed, during new projects the initial 
architecture defined by BETA evolved, and DNTS was involved in the process of architecture 
definition7.As DNTS engineers reported to us “specifics change even substantially. We 
always start from hypotheses that need to be refined”. In this respect engineers stressed that 
“if we develop the system as a black box it is risky. If we open the black box the OEM can 
understand everything. Only opening the back-box DNTS can help BETA in deciding and 
evaluating exactly the consequences of the BETA’s requirements: the black-box approach 
does not allow BETA understanding the impact that some changes required at the system 
                                                
7 Beyond the realm of the specific project, DNTS reported to us that, especially when the project is new, Beta 
employs a parallel approach in developing the components. The DNTS R&D manger explained that when Beta 
starts developing the A/C system it builds on simple constraints such as, for example, the definition of the 
physical interface between the engine and the cockpit. 
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level might have on the overall A/C performance, while an intense information sharing helps 
BETA in better defining the final system-configuration”.  
As the engineers at DNTS explained, “We give the elements to evaluate different 
solutions, we do not suggest the best”. Therefore BETA had the competences to decide which 
solution fit better the requirements of its cars. But the DNTS’s engineer also said: “We have a 
clear understanding of the technical interdependencies among the A/C system and the other 
car’s components” while “BETA understands about 50% of these interdependencies”. This 
was because even if BETA was the final integrator it was not expert of the impact that 
changes in the A/C system’s architecture had on its overall performance. The DNTS 
engineers in this respect said that “When BETA requires changes in the A/C system it needs 
our competencies to evaluate their impact on the A/C system performances. In such cases, 
DNTS highlights these consequences and eventually suggests other solutions. The final 
decision is taken by BETA”.  
DNTS interviewees reported that BETA had strong competences for what concerns the 
quality management, the detailed breakdown of overall cost of the A/C system and of its 
components. DNTS also acknowledged that BETA architectural knowledge was higher than 
the DNTS’ one but underlined that BETA’s knowledge about the components was definitely 
low. 
How could BETA have such a detailed knowledge about the costs of components and 
their quality but little knowledge about the sub-components technologies? DNTS managers 
told us that BETA had developed a very detailed database and asked DNTS to disclose all the 
information it possessed on the cost of components and even subcomponents. Moreover, 
BETA had developed a reliable reporting system on eventual problems that the A/C systems 
reported on the market. The cross comparison of cost details and technical and functional 
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problems allows BETA to guide DNTS’s choices without an in depth technical knowledge 
about the components themselves. 
The DNTS manager stressed the importance of learning from experience. For every 
project, as for Project-B, that BETA co-develops with its suppliers, it analyses the “warranty 
costs” in order to understand how and where to improve the A/C system and set the next 
generation of A/C performance targets. Everything that BETA learns is carefully codified in 
written procedures. These procedures are helpful for DNTS “because better specifics help 
avoiding past problems”. The rules codified by BETA are both contained in the product 
specifics and in the validation plans. This systematic approach allowed BETA to acquire an 
expertise on the overall A/C system’s cost and of its sub-components, to control the A/C 
system performance and its integration. Our interviewee reported to us that BETA’s 
systematic approach helped the car maker to compensate a lack of investment in the 
development of component specific knowledge. 
 
The role of high-powered inter-organizational coordination mechanisms 
DNTS managers confirmed in many occasions BETA’s attitude towards the codification of 
co-development practices into standard procedures: “every day there might be component 
innovations but every activity in the development process is totally routinized”. DNTS 
managers, in fact, stressed that BETA had a very strict procedure to manage its relationships 
with suppliers. BETA controlled the project status through a procedure made of five steps and 
some very detailed milestones and required monthly meetings plus others appointments. Each 
milestone had a corresponding BETA’s specialist. Moreover, BETA had several inspectors 
that supervised the activities developed by DNTS. DNTS’s opinion of this approach was 
usually that this strict procedure did not always correspond to a robust engineering approach 
to problem solving. The true value-added of each milestone “often depends on the specific 
24 
 
person that manages the procedure’s step”. Of course, the strict recourse to procedures also 
produced the result that “they are good technicians but due to too many procedures some time 
we risk stopping the project”. Intense communication and frequent information sharing in all 
the available forms were, however, a standard practice. 
On a final note, BETA, due to time and cost constraints, was starting externalizing some 
of the control activities to third parties, like engineering companies. DNTS’s people reported 
to us “that they [third parties] do not have high technical competences and the power to 
eventually let BETA understand the importance of our suggestions or requirements”. This, of 
course, risked to complicate the picture and required more informal communication between 
DNTS and BETA people. 
 
The nature of the DNTS-BETA relationship 
Also the relationship with BETA was perceived as substantially cooperative: “with the 
operative teams we have a very good and cooperative relationship”.  
BETA was known for having strict systems and procedures to analyze the costs of the 
A/C system’s components and asked many details about the costs of the components that 
DNTS purchased. In this respect, BETA required ad hoc meetings to analyze the components 
chosen by DNTS, and sometimes imposed restrictions about the second tier suppliers and also 
preferences about their nationality. However, BETA’s main concerns were on costs: “they 
send some analysts that control step by step all the variables we include in the price 
definition”. BETA did not evaluate all sub-components, but it had the knowledge to evaluate 
the components with the highest impact on the overall product cost.  
BETA required producing the A/C systems near its plants. As well as ALPHA, BETA 
asked for cost cutting of 3% each year for three years. DNTS, in this case, had to develop a 
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complete cost breakdown and analysis with BETA. BETA paid “cash” the manufacturing 
tools and equipments.  
Finally, despite in the past BETA had changed supplier during the life of the project, 
DNTS’s sales and marketing manager considered this eventuality not probable because it 
would have not been economically convenient for a competitor to enter in a project of another 
supplier and because BETA paid the tools ex-ante. 
 
 A comparison of ALPHA’s and BETA’s relational strategies 
Our description of the two projects shows a nuanced picture of what drove the division 
of labor and the coordination mechanisms in the. The same A/C system (same architecture, 
same complexity, same market segment) was co-developed according to a different 
conceptual definition of the interfaces and employing different organizational solutions.  
In this section we analyze the main differences between Project-A and Project-B as they 
emerged from the interviews and the company documents. We present these differences as 
characterizing, respectively, the ALPHA’s and BETA’s approaches. We solicited the 
interviewees on the generalizability of the findings and were confirmed that the two projects 
were fully representative of the “usual” division of labor and coordination mechanisms 
employed in the relationship between DNTS and the two car makers.  
 
Interface definition and knowledge boundaries 
ALPHA demonstrated to possess an in depth system and component specific knowledge 
that it used to define in detail both the A/C system’s architecture and some of its components. 
Moreover, according to the people we interviewed at DNTS, ALPHA managed to keep most 
specifics pretty stable. The main motivation was to leverage the same A/C system in different 
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models. The main drawback was the limited supplier’s freedom in suggesting new and 
different architectural solutions.  
DNTS’s engineers also agreed that the interface standardization did not eliminate the 
information sharing due to the existence of complex functional interdependencies between the 
A/C system and other components of the car: ALPHA achieved a high interface 
standardization level but did not manage to achieve functional isolation. ALPHA, hence, in 
order to control some of the residual functional interactions, had to be involved in the 
definition of the characteristics of inner components. Even if this approach allowed creating 
stable interfaces, according to DNTS engineers, this approach was not truly helpful to 
improve the overall system performance and innovativeness. The reason is, according to 
DNTS’s managers, that ALPHA should have made a step back, in detailing the specifics of 
inner components.  
BETA’s approach was in many respects different. BETA co-developed the A/C system 
with the supplier even for what concerned the system architecture definition and its 
interdependences with the rest of the vehicle: the system main concept and architecture was 
set at the beginning but it changed during the project and BETA allowed DNTS suggesting 
several improvements even at the architectural level. According to DNTS engineers, this 
approach had some advantages: it increased the possibility to introduce important innovations 
and improvements and reduced the development time. The main drawback was that the 
project was less stable, because as DNTS could ask architectural changes, even other 
suppliers could do so. Moreover, the BETA approach in developing the product often 
translated into a lower level of architectural standardization of the A/C system, especially for 
what concerned the interfaces standardization. Therefore, the overall component 
standardization level of the BETA A/C system was lower than the ALPHA one. In fact, while 
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ALPHA seemed investing in common platforms and standards, the BETA approach was 
different.  
Figure 1 and 2 represent the ALPHA and BETA approaches in the A/C system 
development. The main rectangle delimited by the green frame represents the A/C interfaces, 
the small rectangles represents the inner A/C sub-components, and the oval the overall 
engineering solutions. ALPHA fully specified all the interfaces (the green zone), some active 
components (the blue boxes inside the A/C system boundaries), and other characteristics of 
the A/C (based on previous engineering solutions). The white zones were those fully managed 
by DNTS.  
 
Insert Figure 1 approximately here 
Insert Figure 2 approximately here 
 
Hence, our finding shows that there is a tight link between the way the OEMs define the 
interfaces and the knowledge partitioning between OEM and suppliers. Moreover, we found 
that OEM and suppliers integration was eased when interfaces were either detailed and stable 
over the life of the project (DNTS-ALPHA case) or general and fluid over the life of the 
project (DNTS-BETA).  
In the former case, we observed that the OEM together with stable and detailed 
interfaces also gave technical directions on how the suppliers should develop the A/C system 
and its inner components. According to our company informants this approach worked 
because ALPHA had developed an in-depth knowledge of the A/C system architecture and 
components. This seems to point to the fact that low OEM-supplier integration costs (e.g. 
need of re-design, further info sharing, etc.), intense information sharing and inter-
organizational formal procedures are associated to a better and more effective definition of 
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standard and stable interfaces only if the OEM is vertically integrated (i.e. holds component 
specific knowledge).  
In the second case (DNTS-BETA) the OEM gave indications concerning the interfaces 
between the system and the rest of the product in a black box sourcing fashion, i.e. without 
specifying the A/C system architecture and inner components. However, since the OEM knew 
little about the interdependences and interactions between the components within the system 
and the rest of the product it must be prepared to face intense information sharing during the 
project. We infer from this evidence that, in order to increase the chances of optimizing 
information sharing and coordination costs the OEM which designs fluid interfaces should set 
up inter-organizational routines that are stable enough to support mutual adjustments in the 
interfaces design and engineering. 
Counter intuitively, we found black box sourcing associated with intense inter-firm 
coordination and information sharing. The explanation we were provided by DNTS’s 
managers is that what matters for minimizing information sharing is the level of knowledge 
held by the OEM and its ability to predict the technical interdependences characterizing the 
design over the life of the project (as the DNTS-ALPHA case shows). In black box sourcing, 
that we associate with the decision of the OEM to not directly invest in component specific 
knowledge, the OEM tends to focus on the interface definition. However, the OEM lack of 
component specific knowledge often leads, when technical interdependences are complex, to 
re-design or adjust these interfaces during the life of the project (the OEM lack of component 
specific knowledge prevents the OEM from being able to address all the possible integration 
problems ex-ante). For this reason, routinized information sharing has to compensate the need 
of information sharing arising from the OEM lack of technical know-how (as the DNTS-
BETA case shows).  
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Persistent integrality and organizational consistency 
Our case study confirms that some of the “rules of thumb” based on the relationship 
between product architecture, outsourcing decisions and inter-organizational coordination 
mechanisms are often incorrect. For example, we observed that the reliance on standard and 
stable interfaces was the consequence and not the cause of vertical integration decisions (on 
this point our results are consistent with those of Fixson et al., 2005). In both the BETA and 
ALPHA cases we observed that product architecture was not a major determinant of inter-
firm coordination mechanisms and relational setting. The two A/C systems, despite the 
similarities in terms of characteristics, architecture and performance, were developed by 
DNTS on the basis of interfaces that were defined by ALPHA and BETA in two substantially 
different ways. This shows that the decision to rely on stable and detailed interfaces vs. fluid 
and changing ones was not linked to intrinsic characteristics of the system under development 
(i.e. its product architecture) but derived from a deliberate choice of the OEM regarding its 
level of knowledge concerning the components technology and the involvement in its design 
(i.e. vertical integration).  
The “relational style” (Sabel et al, 2008) characterizing the relationship followed as a 
natural consequence. While BETA, in need of compensating its lack of component knowledge 
with a more sophisticated and structured inter-organizational procedures, pushed towards a 
more formalized relationship, ALPHA, being more in control of the technical 
interdependences, relied more on standard and stable interfaces that were complemented by 
more informal coordination. Such informal coordination, however, was deliberate and 
systematic as ALPHA asked for co-located development teams and frequent information 
sharing. Both relationships were considered by DNTS as cooperative and successful. DNTS’s 
managers used the term “consistent” to describe BETA and ALPHA behavior. 
30 
 
The key to understand why both co-development systems are consistent lies in the 
understanding of the very logic on which the two systems hinge. Both ALPHA and BETA 
seem to be aware of the need of addressing functional interdependences between the A/C 
system and the rest of the vehicle. ALPHA’s high competence on the A/C system technology 
and its components put the company in the position of designing interfaces between the A/C 
system and the rest of the vehicle that addressed most of the functional interdependences ex 
ante. BETA, vice versa, knowing that it lacked the necessary component specific knowledge 
for developing technical specifications and address functional interdependencies ex ante, 
hinged on fluid interfaces and on a higher contribution of DNTS in the definition of the A/C 
system components. In addition to this, BETA, acknowledging the necessity of structuring 
communication in more detail, set up very structured inter-firm information sharing 
processes. In both cases, we observed that neither the nature of the relationship nor the need 
of frequent and intense communication depended on the type of interfaces used.  
ALPHA managed to achieve an efficient and effective coordination by leveraging stable 
interfaces but not implementing a black box sourcing that notably hinges on the detailed ex 
ante specification of standard interfaces. In fact, ALPHA did design the interfaces but 
employed and “hands-on” approach on component design, so contrasting with the 
stereotypical idea of black box sourcing. On the other hand, BETA was also successful by 
adopting an “hands-off” approach on component technologies without pretending to apply a 
stereotypical black box sourcing measure, i.e. identifying stable and detailed interfaces. The 
lack of component specific knowledge, was then compensated by noteworthy investments in 
developing organizational capabilities. 
The level of design and engineering know how as well as the inter-firm organizational 
routines and capabilities of the car maker seemed to be the main determinants of the 
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organizational settings used to manage the two projects we observed. Table 2 provides a 
synthesis. 
 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our study extends research on strategic inter-firm knowledge partitioning as well as on 
the information-processing view of product development. First, it provides additional, micro-
level empirical evidence for the claim that firms' knowledge boundaries extend beyond firms’ 
task boundaries (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Lee and Veloso, 2008). Second, it shows that - 
ceteris paribus - the imperfect overlap between task and knowledge partitioning also differs 
across firms. We show that the reason why firms make different choices concerning their 
boundaries does not only lie in differences in the product architecture. Similarly to what 
happens to the allocation of tasks (Wolter and Veloso, 2007), also the degree of overlap in 
knowledge domains between an assembler and its suppliers is not technologically determined, 
as the standard modularity literature would argue (Frigant and Talbot, 2005). Our findings 
confirm that suppliers dominate component knowledge whereas assemblers lead on 
architectural knowledge. However, and more importantly, due to persistent integrality and 
when facing uncertainty we show that firms chose to adjust their knowledge boundary by 
increasing the knowledge overlap along the supply-chain (Mac Duffie, 2008, Lee and Veloso, 
2008). To what extent they do so, however, is a matter of strategy with constraints on options 
coming from inter-firm routines, existing capabilities and previous choices on firm’s 
boundaries.  
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Our case study shows that the same conclusion also applies to the choice of the 
coordination mechanisms. Our findings show that, in fact, the means by which inter-firm 
coordination is achieved is not determined as a consequence of the nature of product 
architecture (modular vs. integral). We reached this conclusion “isolating” the effects of 
product architecture in the management of inter-firm relationships. Our work confirms that 
persistent integrality leads to the impossibility to cope with complex functional integration, 
i.e. a complete fit between subsystem performances and the rest of the vehicle performances,  
and inter firm coordination relying mainly on self contained units, standard and stable 
interfaces. Collaborative buyer-supplier relationships appears as the logical antecedent and the 
condition upon which any modularization process is based and/or complement modularization 
allowing for ex post problem solving due to unforeseen design and supply chain management 
problems. At least in the automotive industry, hence, the need for ‘thick’ and collaborative 
supply relationships persists, no matter how modular components are. 
 Moreover, our empirical evidence contributes to the understanding of the rationale 
according to which firms employ different organizational practices by highlighting the 
variables that influence the firms’ choice about coordination. Contrary to previous literature 
that emphasizes the centrality of product architecture in deciding on inter-firm coordination 
and integration mechanisms, we show that inter-firm coordination actually depends on the 
level of component specific knowledge that OEMs have maintained in house, the 
technological capabilities they have developed over time, and the organizational capability to 
design and operate high-power inter-firm coordination mechanisms. The supplier in our 
sample considered the consistency of these variables as the key for successfully coordinating 
inter-firm relationships.  
The centrality given to organizational consistency rather that to technology led 
considerations fosters new research towards the direction of a deeper understanding of how 
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firms can achieve such internal and external consistency over time and across projects. Both 
component specific knowledge, organizational competences and inter-firms routine are 
interdependent and dynamic. 
Finally, our results shows the need of further research in order to provide a better 
understanding of what drives the division of labor between firms and the coordination of 
knowledge production in industries characterized by persistent integrality. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. List and duration of interviews at DNTS 
DNTS interviewees Duration 
R&D chief  1h30min 
R&D chief for Alpha  2h30min 
R&D chief of the project for Alpha  2h30min 
R&D chief for Beta  1h45min 
Sales & marketing manager for Alpha  1h10min 
Sales & marketing manager for Beta  1h 
 
Table 2. A comparative analysis of the Alpha and Beta projects 
OEM Alpha (Project-A) Beta (Project-B) 
A/C system architectural  
knowledge 
High Low 
A/C systems sub components 
knowledge 
High Low 
Interface stability within the A/C 
systems 
High and tightly controlled Not controlled 
Interfaces stability between the A/C 
System and the rest of the vehicle 
High Low 
Information sharing High High 
Physical co-location of DNTS 
engineers 
Yes No 
Relevance of inter-firm written 
procedures  
Low High 
Emphasis on sub component cost 
disclosure 
Low High 
 
 
Figure 1. The ALPHA approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The BETA approach 
 
 
 
